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What makes countries initiate WTO disputes on food-
related issues?
Christian Götz, Thomas Heckelei, Bettina Rudloff 
Abstract 
This paper analyses relevant determinants for the probability to initiate a 
dispute on policy measures under the World Trade Organization (WTO) dis-
pute settlement system. The empirical analysis differs from existing assess-
ments by focusing on agri-food related disputes and provides a more in-depth 
analysis of specific country and sectoral characteristics not considered in pre-
vious studies. Contrary to recent analyses of overall trade disputes, the results 
show that some determinants such as legal capacity and monetary means are 
not statistically significant. Own protectionist behaviour, endured protection-
ism, and the duration of WTO membership, however, could be identified as 
relevant determinants with the expected direction of impact. 
Keywords: WTO dispute, agri-food sector, binary choice model. 
JEL-classification: C12, C13, F13 
1  Introduction 
The dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was set 
into force as a part of the WTO Agreement on January 1, 1995. It is the device for 
the resolution of conflicts arising between Members over the interpretation of 
their commitments under the regime of the organization. Dispute settlement must 
be self-enforcing, i.e. from the consultation to the potential compliance phase all 
actions are driven by Members. Referred to as the “central pillar of the multilat-
eral trading system” (WTO, 2007a) the design of the WTO dispute settlement 
system is central to the debate on institutional reforms of the WTO and has also 
been under negotiation at the current WTO Doha round of negotiations. A major 
desire is to make the settlement system more effective and to allow for the appro-
priate consideration of developing countries’ demands. Reform proposals span a 
wide field from tightening time frames regarding panel proceedings over more 
effectively dealing with compliance and compensation procedures to assistance 
for developing countries ensuring their equality of opportunity (PETERSMANN, 
2003). However, the understanding of the factors that drive the system is required 
for targeted improvement. 
The question addressed in this paper is, therefore, which Members’ character-
istics explain their activity as complainants in WTO food-related trade disputes. 
Compared to previous empirical studies, this investigation provides an in-depth  
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analysis of food-related disputes and considers new potential determinants that 
may supplement the understanding of what drives the use of the dispute settle-
ment system. The empirical investigation is based on a dispute distribution model 
developed and employed by HORN ET AL. (1999). 
This paper is organised as follows: After a short description of the WTO dis-
pute settlement’s features and the food-related caseload of the investigation pe-
riod, a survey on existing empirical studies is provided. The model specification, 
including a discussion of considered determinants, is described in the next chap-
ter. Statistical implementation and estimation results are subsequently presented 
before concluding. 
2  Facts and figures on WTO dispute settlement 
All Members are provided with equal right to seek adjudication through the WTO 
dispute settlement system. Acceptable reasons for filing a complaint are a trading 
partner’s measures that nullify the benefits or impair the attainment of any objec-
tive of one or more of the WTO Agreements. The system’s rules and procedures 
generally are administered by the General Council, i.e. the plenary meeting of the 
WTO at the level of governmental officials, which turns itself into the Dispute 
Settlement Body when adjudicating trade disputes. Dispute settlement procedures 
are stricter under the WTO compared to those in force under its predecessor 
GATT 1947. This is due to the elimination of blocking or delaying tactics through 
the adoption of time limits for all stages of adjudication, the implementation of 
standard terms of reference for panels, and an improved mechanism for enforce-
ment of compliance with panel rulings (HOEKMAN AND KOSTEKI 2001). This is 
in particular owing to the implementation of the so called ‘negative consensus’, 
which means that a panel is established, a panel report adopted, or the complain-
ant authorized to trade related retaliation unless the DSB decides by consensus to 
reject.
1 
In the area of food-related disputes, 147 cases have been initiated over the pe-
riod from January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2006.
2 Regarding country participation the 
figures on current and previous food-related WTO disputes reveal that the major-
ity of cases are related to the economically advanced countries. Table 1 shows the 
participation pattern by development classification of the UNITED  NATIONS 
                                                       
 
 
1 The ‘Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes’ is laid down 
in Annex 2 of the ‘Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization’ from April 
15, 1994.   
2 These 147 cases refer to nine different Agreements related to issues on food, see footnote 7.  
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(2008) for the period January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2006.
3 The Members of the 
European Communities are not separately captured in the statistic, thus reducing 
the number of WTO Members to 134 instead of 149
4. 
Table 1. Food-related dispute initiations by development classification until June 
30, 2006 
Group 








Developed  31 0,23 97 0,66 
Developing  71 0,53 50 0,34 
Least Developed  32  0,24  0  0 
Total  134  147  
Source: Own compilation based on WTO (2007b) and UNITED NATIONS (2008) 
Representing 23% of the WTO membership, the group of developed countries 
are the most active users with 66% of all initiated food-related disputes. 34% of 
all disputes are initiated by the large group of developing countries. The group of 
Least Developed Countries
5 accounts for about 24% of WTO Members, but they 
did not use the system at all for food related issues. This is remarkable since food-
sector related exports generally represents a substantial share in their export struc-
ture. 
As there exists no established principle for the assignment of the developed or 
developing status in the United Nations system, a pattern which more precisely 
defines the economic status refers to the World Bank classification of income 
levels
6. Table 2 depicts the initiation pattern related to per capita income groups. 
                                                       
 
 
3 The developing status according to the WTO is based on members’ self-declaration and not on 
verified economic attributes. 
4 The European Communities comprised 15 Members until April 30, 2004. Disputes of its 10 new 
Members from May 1, 2004 on are captured separately and not assigned to the EC in Table 1. 
5 32 of currently 150 WTO members are classified as Least Developed Countries. The identification 
of their status by the United Nations is dependent on the following economic criteria: (1) a low per 
capita income criterion, (2) a human resource weakness criterion and (3) an economic vulnerability 
criterion (United Nations, 2007).  
6 Per capita income classification according to The World Bank (2008): Low income: $875 or less, 
Lower Middle Income: $876-3465, Upper Middle Income: $3466-10,725, High Income: >$10,726.  
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Table 2. Food-related dispute initiations by per capita income classes until June 
30, 2006 










High income  43  0,32  5  0,03 
Upper middle income  36  0,27  31  0,21 
Lower middle income  30  0,22  20  0,14 
Low income  25  0,19  91  0,62 
Total  134  147  
Source: Own compilation based on WTO (2007b) and THE WORLD BANK (2008) 
High income Members initiated 62% of all food-related disputes. Members of 
the Upper middle and Lower middle income groups account for about 25% of all 
initiated disputes, whereas Members of the Low income group are almost com-
pletely absent. The United States and the European Union dominate the High 
income group, followed by Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador, Philippines and Thailand in the Middle income groups, and India in the 
Low income group are examples for comparatively actice users of the system. 
As is evident from the brief description above, the WTO dispute settlement 
system’s rules themselves do not discriminate between Members and offer equal 
opportunities for dispute initiation. Therefore, it is of some interest to investigate 
what are the major determinants for observing this pattern of dispute initiation 
across countries and whether other than the most prominent attribute “income” 
may influence a Member’s decision to file a complaint. 
3  Empirical analyses on general dispute initiation 
A few empirical assessments on the WTO initiation of disputes exist considering 
various determinants, agreements referred to, and roles in a dispute (complainant, 
defendant, co-complainant and interested party). Table 3 depicts their investiga-
tion period, dispute coverage, main issue of analysis and the models used. Table 4 
comprises the detected influences of determinants under previous investigations. 
HORN ET AL. (1999) mark the first empirical investigation by using a bino-
mial dispute distribution model. According to their analysis the dispute initation 
pattern is to a large extent reflected by the pattern of export diversity and value. 
GDP did not reveal a significant influence, but a country’s legal capacity shows a 
slight positive influence on its probability to complain. BESSON AND MEHDI 
(2004) find empirical evidence that legal capacity matters with respect to a coun-
try’s likelihood to win disputes. This supports the conclusion of BUSCH AND 
REINHARDT (2003) that early settlements of developing countries, i.e. in the 
consultation stage or in the Panel stage before a ruling, are missing due to the lack 
of legal capacity.  
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Table 3. Survey on investigation period, dispute coverage, main issue and used 
model of previous empirical studies 
Empirical  
study 





Horn et al. 
(1999) 
WTO disputes; 1995-
1998; 155 complaints; 
all agreements  
Determinants for the 
initiation of complaints 
Binomial dispute 
distribution model 
Holmes et al. 
(2003) 
WTO disputes; 1995-
2002; 279 complaints; 
all agreements 
Involvement in com-
plaints (both sides) 






GATT & WTO disputes; 
1973-1998; 174 com-
plaints; all agreements 
Determinants for com-





GATT & WTO disputes; 
1992-2003; complaints 
against U.S. trade 
remedies  
Initiation of complaints 






2002; 40 complaints of 
developing against 
developed countries 







2000; 54 complaints; 
complaints against 








Source: Own compilation 
The self-enforcing nature of the dispute settlement system has been the starting 
point for BOWN (2004a,  2004b and 2005): A focus lies on costs of running a 
dispute and a country’s retaliation power to finally enforce compliance by penalty 
tariffs on imports of the condemned party. BAGWELL AND STAIGER (2000) and 
DAM (1970) state that the retaliation threat always has been a central component 
of the GATT system. The success of this power is linked to the countries’ rele-
vance as trade partner and there exists also theoretical support that the retaliation 
threat is not uniformly distributed over Members and that imbalances relating to 
trade volume and market size shows influence on their force under trade disputes. 
BOWN (2002) demonstrates that a country’s capacity to influence its terms-of-
trade determines the credibility of its retaliation threat which is confirmed as well 
by JOHNSON (1953) and KENNAN AND RIEZMAN (1988). 
BOWN (2005) concentrates on the question whether to join complaints as co-
complainant or interested party and demonstrated a positive impact of the capac- 
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ity to absorb legal costs on both decisions. Additionally, he identifies a positive 
effect of a Member’s retaliatory capacity in terms of its relevance as trading part-
ner and a negative impact of countries’ dependencies on bilateral development 
aid. BOWN (2004c) shows that the threat of retaliation is significant for determin-
ing whether a government chooses to abide by its international obligations. BOWN 
(2004b) demonstrates that the successful economic resolution to disputes is influ-
enced by the threat of retaliation by the complainant. In respect of developing 
countries success in disputes BESSON AND MEHDI (2004) discover empirical sup-
port for the influence of their trade retaliation power. 
Market access and exporting interests are expected to be relevant for the deci-
sion on initiation or participation and there exists empirical substantiation for this. 
BOWN (2005) provides support for the positive impact of a country’s volume of 
exports at stake in its decision to attend disputes as co-complainant or interested 
third party and BOWN (2004d) demonstrates its positive influence on the likeli-
hood to complain against United States (U.S.) imposed trade remedies. In the 
broader sense there is evidence for the relevance of trade volume or share respec-
tively. HOLMES, ROLLO AND YOUNG (2003) reach the conclusion that a Mem-
ber’s trade volume determines its likelihood to file complaints on the basis of 
simple descriptive statistics. This supports the findings of HORN ET AL. (1999) 
that trade volume and export diversity are closely correlated. 
BOWN (2004a) finds only limited confirmation that international obligations 
affect a country’s decision to fulfil its commitments whereas BOWN (2005) finds 
empirical evidence on the positive influence of a Member’s international eco-
nomic relationships – measured by its engagement in preferential trade agree-
ments – on its decision to formally engage in a dispute as co-complainant or in-
terested third party. On the topic of success in disputes, the results of BESSON 
AND MEHDI (2004) suggest that international economic relationships show influ-
ence on a Member’s likelihood to win and they conclude that the reliance on bi-
lateral assistance has a negative impact on the success. Further, they discuss the 
impact of military power and find confirmation for the negative influence that 
military powerful defendants have on the performance of developing countries in 
dispute.  
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Table 4. Survey on findings of previous empirical studies 
    Influence on the likelihood to 












sity  Horn et al. (1999)  +      
Exporting 
interest  Bown (2005)   +    
Export volume  Holmes et al. 
(2003)  +      
Bown (2005)   +    
Gross Domes-
tic Product 
Horn et al. (1999)  0      
Bown (2004b)      0  






hdi (2004)     −  
Besson and Me-




Bown (2005)    −    
Horn et al. (1999)  +      
Legal capacity 
Besson and Me-
hdi (2004)     +   
Bown (2004b)      +  
Military power 
Besson and Me-
hdi (2004)     +   
Bown (2004d)  +      




hdi (2004)     0   
+ positive influence; - negative influence; 0 no influence 
Source: Own compilation 
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4  Assessing relevance of determinants 
4.1  A binomial dispute initiation model 
 
This analysis is based on the model first presented by HORN ET AL. (1999): The 
initiation decision is described through a binary choice model in which the Mem-
ber’s probability to complain against another Member is dependent on a set of the 
complainant’s traits or the characteristics of its specific environment. The impli-
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where  ij y  is the binary dependent variable which takes 1 for a complaint and 0 for 
no complaint, βdenotes the vector of K coefficients, i and j  indicate the com-
plainant and the defendant respectively. The set of K influences is merged in vec-
tor  i x . Function  () πii x β calculates the individual probability to complain for a 
prospective complainant i which can be represented by any cumulative probabil-
ity distribution function. Here, we use the widely employed conditional logistic 
distribution, 
 














which would result in the well-known Logit model when applied to single trials. 
The proceeding for the assessment of determinants is the reproduction of the 
observed sample of dispute initiation over the period from January 1, 1995 to 
June 30, 2006 based on a dispute distribution function which yields probabilities 
for positive integers, i.e. the number of a Member’s initiated disputes. Assuming 
that the probability for a litigation decision  () ii π x β  is constant from one trial to 
the next and that successive trials are independent, Member  ' is  probability for  i c  
complaints in  i n  trials against all other WTO Members is then specified through 
the Binomial distribution 
  ()() () ,, 1
i ii i







=− ⎡⎤ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦
⎝⎠
x β x β x β , (3)  
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where  =∑ ii j
j
cy . The expected number of Member  ' is  complaints against allo-
ther WTO Members is then given by the expected value of the Binomial distribu-
tion, 
  () ( ) ii i i Ec n π = x β , (4) 
which is strictly proportional to the number of independent Bernoulli trials  i n . 
The applied method is maximum likelihood estimation. Assuming that the data 
drawn from this Binomial distribution is independent and identically distributed 
with unknown parameter β , the likelihood function, i.e. the joint probability den-
sity of observing the given sample of complaints () 12 , ,..., m cc c  is specified by 













=− ⎡⎤ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦
⎝⎠ ∏ β xx β x β . (5) 
Starting from the logarithmic likelihood function 
() ()( ) ()
1
ln , , ln ln ln 1
m
i
i i i i ii i i ii
i i
n





=+ + − − ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎝⎠ ⎣⎦ ∑ β xx β x β (6) 
the first order conditions for a maximum are 

















Restricting the vector of determinants to a constant, the probability to complain 
reduces to  () ii ππ = x β  for all Members i and can be determined analytically by 







. Hence, for the restricted model, the maximum likelihood estimator of 
the probability to initiate a dispute is simply the number of observed complaints 
over the total number of independent Bernoulli trials. 
The definition of the number of independent Bernoulli trials requires informa-
tion about the exact number of infringements that each Member faces, as the 
aforementioned binary choice model refers to the litigation decision when WTO 
obligations are violated. For the reason that we have no a priori information about  
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the existence of inconsistent trade measures – their existence can merely be as-
sured after a positive Dispute Settlement Body or Appellate Body ruling – the 
analysis is based on an assumption about their distribution. For HORN ET AL. 
(1999) the number of independent Bernoulli trials is dependent on a country’s 
export diversification, i.e. its number of different exported goods over all products 
and trading partners under the regime of the WTO. Each counted bilateral export 
flow is considered as one trial. They worked on the assumption that “disputable 
trade measures” (DTM) are uniformly distributed over all bilateral export flows. 
The problem of this approach is that the determinants for the occurrence of dis-
putes cannot be separately identified from the impacts on the existence of DTM, 
leading to an “export diversity bias”, i.e. an increase in disputes with increasing 
export diversity. This problem already was a central criticism of HOLMES, ROLLO 
AND YOUNG (2003). 
Following the approach of HORN ET AL. (1999) we try to mitigate the problem 
of missing information about the distribution of infringements by incorporating 
two new indicators: Endured Protectionism by Trade Partner and Own Imposed 
Protectionism. In addition to this information on the likelihood of DTM in export 
flows, the attempt of HORN ET AL. (1999) to select the relevant export flows is 
slightly modified by taking empirical instead of parameterized values for average 
induced litigation costs into account. 
4.2  Determinants considered 
Deviating from existing studies, this paper focuses specifically on agricultural and 
food-related disputes in order to develop an in-depth analysis of determinants 
relevant in this sector and to additionally introduce new potential determinants. 
The set of determinants or countries’ traits already used in prior studies is re-
flected by agricultural trade flows characterising the export diversity, a country’s 
wealth and its legal capacity. Due to limited data availability for some determi-
nants under investigation the Members sample is limited to 53 while maintaining 
the distribution over income classes. 
Disputes data 
Dispute initiations were collected that affected products of the food sector.
7 The 
investigation covers the period from January 1, 1995, to June 30, 2006. Each ini-
                                                       
 
 
7 Agricultural and food related issues comprise initiated disputes which were raised under the fol-
lowing agreements: Agreement on Agriculture, Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regula-
tions, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Agreement on Safeguards, General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Agreement on Trade 
Related Investment Measures, Anti-Dumping-Agreement and the Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures.  
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tiation is counted once to avoid double counting, thus omitting re-uptakes of dis-
putes that occur when the consultation period of 12 months is exceeded. For 
jointly filed initiations, each participant is assigned one dispute. When one Mem-
ber simultaneously requests for consultations on the same subject but with differ-
ent defendants each one is counted on its own. Since the European Communities 
(EC) is a single customs union with a harmonised trade policy and common tariffs 
all disputes initiated by its Members are assigned to the EC. On the other hand, 
when disputes are initiated against several EC Members there is only one dispute 
assigned, including all defendants. The number of disputes for each Member is 










=⋅ , (8) 
where 
*
i y  is the time-corrected number of disputes of Member i, 
o
i y  assigns 
Member  ' is  observed disputes over its WTO membership time  i t  and T  stands 
for the investigation period. This proceeding is self-evident, since the number of 
filed disputes ought to be linked to a Member’s membership time in the WTO. By 
this means the time-bias is taken care of. 
Export diversity 
Here we adopt the approach first presented by HORN ET AL. (1999). Strictly 
speaking, export diversification is not an explanatory variable, but an intrinsic 
component of the underlying binomial dispute distribution model as the total 
number of trials depends on the number of export flows. They found empirical 
support for the dependency of a Member’s activity as complainant from its export 
diversity, i.e. its number of different exported goods over all trading partners. The 
underlying principle lies in the expectation of an increased probability to encoun-
ter infringements if a Member’s export diversity increases. This is self-evident if 
we assume infringements to be uniformly distributed over all markets, products 
and trading partners. Hence, we expect the number of disputes to be positively 
related to Members’ amount of different bilateral export flows. The export diver-
sification factor’s explanatory contribution content is just confirmable by exclud-
ing all other variables as the expected number of complaints is proportional to the 
number of a country’s export flows. Export flows come from EUROCARE (2006) 
available on an aggregation level comparable to the HS
8-4-level. 
Induced costs of litigation 
                                                       
 
 
8 Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System of the World Customs Organization 
(WCO)  
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HORN ET AL. (1999) were the first analysing the litigation costs involved and 
demonstrated their relevance. Their approach is followed through the implementa-
tion of a threshold for counting a Member’s bilateral export flows, thus excluding 
flows under a certain value not being worth to fight for. According to calculations 
of NORDSTRÖM (2005), average costs for dispute settlement proceedings range 
from $128K to $706K, dependent on the degree of its complexity and the per hour 
rate of engaged lawyers. Hence, the analysis is conducted for four different litiga-
tion cost levels, i.e. excluding all flows below the respective threshold: $0 when 
no threshold is applied, $300K for low costs, $500K for medium costs and $700K 
for high litigation costs. The impact of the adopted cost-thresholds is shown for 
the restricted model, i.e. to the exclusion of all explanatory variables, thus com-
paring different cost thresholds with respect to the corresponding model’s predic-
tion quality. 
Endured protectionism by trade partner 
This is to our knowledge the first empirical effort to incorporate information 
about the distribution of WTO-inconsistent trade barriers to reduce the lack of 
information about the existence of actual infringements which is the precondition 
to each dispute. It is assumed that the more protective the trade policy of a coun-
try’s trading partners is, the higher the probability that it faces disputable trade 
barriers. Hence, we expect the number of initiated disputes to be positively related 
to a country’s faced trade restrictiveness. For this purpose the Market Access 
Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (MA-OTRI) provided by Kee, Nicita and 
Olarreaga (2006) is used. It compromises a tariff equivalent of all barriers that 
exporters of the respective country face on average. 
Own protectionist behaviour 
Another hypothesis is that the number of its filed disputes is negatively related to 
a country’s tendency towards protectionism. The rationale behind this is the as-
sumption that a more protective Member faces also a greater likelihood to become 
“victim” of an accusation. We presume a more protective country to pursue a 
defensive and peaceful strategy to not provoke to be challenged itself. On the 
other hand we hypothesize that more protective countries have a lower propensity 
to fight for market liberalisation. For this purpose the Overall Trade Restrictive-
ness Index (OTRI) by KEE, NICITA AND OLARREAGA (2006) is used as a measure 
for a country’s inclination to restrictive policies. It is a tariff equivalent for all 
trade barriers which the respective country imposes in average upon the rest of the 
world. Consequently, it provides the mirror image of the aforementioned 
MAOTRI indicator, measuring the trade restrictiveness from the potential com-
plainant’s perspective. 
Relevance of the agricultural sector  
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Independent from a country’s contact to a trading partner we expect the overall 
importance of the agricultural sector having a positive influence on initiating a 
case: the higher the overall economic relevance, the more sensitive a country may 
be regarding violations. To quantify the sector’s importance the agricultural share 
of a Member’s GDP is employed. This rather crude indicator is used due to miss-
ing data on the value of the countries’ food industry. An improved measure 
should comprise information on the relevance of a Member’s whole agri-food 
sector. The data is drawn from the UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE 
AND DEVELOPMENT (2002 and 2003). 
Capacity to absorb legal costs/wealth 
The capacity to absorb legal costs is supposed to be essential for the accomplish-
ment of disputes as explicit compensation for litigation costs is not intended by 
the system. Even though the expected gains from removing the trade barrier ex-
ceed the induced litigation costs, this potential payoff lies ahead and is uncertain. 
For this reason each potential complainant must anticipate substantial costs that 
are involved by prosecution and, if applicable, also by enforcement of compli-
ance. It is assumed that the number of complaints is positively related to a Mem-
ber’s capacity to absorb legal costs. As proxy for such financial means we use a 
country’s GDP, provided by the UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT (2002 and 2003). 
Legal capacity 
One argument often raised to explain the limited access of the system to develop-
ing and low income countries is their lack of human and legal capacity (see e.g. 
WHALLEY, 1996). HORN ET AL. (1999) found empirical evidence on the matter 
of a country’s legal capacity in respect of initiating disputes. We hypothesise that 
the larger a country’s endowment with skilled legal personnel, the higher its ca-
pability to challenge arguable trade measures of its trading partners and we expect 
the number of bilateral complaints to be positively linked. The respective deter-
minant should comprise the whole extent of a country’s trade administration, i.e. 
its budget, its staff’s size and quality. Since there is no differentiated information 
on Members’ legal capability we use, like HORN ET AL. (1999), their delegation 
size at Geneva as proxy. The respective information comes from the UNITED 
NATIONS (2004). 
Influence of private actors and governmental efficiency 
The influence of private pressure groups on the government is relevant as only the 
government may finally enter a dispute but can be persuaded by private actors in 
doing so. This power may differ among countries depending on the national 
framework for organizing private lobby activities and on their respective rele-
vance. It is increasingly seen as especially relevant for developing countries in 
determining the use of the settlement system (SHAFFER, 2003a; BOWN AND  
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HOEKMAN, 2005). SHAFFER (2003a) and SHAFFER (2003b) demonstrate the rele-
vance of private-public partnerships for the initiation and prosecution of trade 
disputes at the WTO and BESSON AND MEHDI (2004) argue that domestic vari-
ables should be incorporated to handle the potential sources of distortion of the 
dispute settlement procedure. 
To our knowledge this is the first empirical attempt to capture some aspects of 
the aforementioned interaction between the public and the private sector regarding 
dispute initiation. For this purpose two domestic variables are included which are 
provided by KAUFMANN (2004): (i) the Corporate Legal Corruption Component 
(CLCC), measuring legal dimensions of undue political influence by the private 
sector and (ii) the Judicial/Legal Effectiveness Integrity Index (JLEI), assessing 
the effectiveness and integrity of the legal and judicial system. The greater the 
influence of lobbyists, e.g. by legal political finance or by the voice of interests of 
powerful firms, the more successful the private sector is supposed to be in achiev-
ing its export interests. Accordingly, the number of challenged disputes should be 
positively correlated to the amount of undue influence, aggregated in the CLCC 
variable. It is hypothesized, that the higher the efficiency and integrity of the legal 
and judicial system of a country, the higher its ability to identify illegal trade 
measures and to pursue a legal action. Hence, the probability for litigation is pre-
sumed to be positively dependent on the JLEI variable. 
Membership time 
The time of membership may be negatively related to the costs of filing a dispute 
as learning occurs. Hence, we suspect a Member’s experience through its mem-
bership in the WTO to be positively related to its number of filed disputes. An 
index is created over the time since the inception of the organization until June 
30, 2006, relating each Member’s membership time to the whole observation 
period. The associated data is from WTO (2007c).  
The following table provides a survey on all explanatory variables with their 
respective data source and expected impact on the initiation of disputes. 
Table 5. Survey on explanatory variables, data and expected sign 
Explanatory  
variables 
Data Source  Expected   
sign 
Export diversity*  Census of different 
export flows on HS-4 
level 
EuroCARE (2006)  (+) 
Capacity to absorb 
legal costs/wealth* 
Per capita Gross 
Domestic Product 













Data Source  Expected   
sign 
Influence of private 
actors 
Measure of  legal 
dimensions of undue 
political influence by 









tiveness and integrity 
of the legal and judi-
cial system  
Kaufmann (2004): 
Legal and Judicial 
Effectiveness and 
Integrity Index (LJEI) 
+ 
Relevance of the 
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Source: Own compilation 
5  Statistical Implementation and Results 
For the restricted model, the probability to complain is identical for all Members 
and its estimate only dependent on the number of all observed disputes and of the 
sum of bilateral export flows between all trading partners. Hence, improved 
model prediction is merely owing to changes in the distribution of export flows 
over Members by weighing the relevant exports flows, i.e. introducing thresholds 
for accounting only export flows beyond a certain value. The average number of 
export flows declines from 5530 in case of no threshold to 65 when the highest 
threshold of $700K is used. The fit of the model is measured by two different 
indicators: the fraction of exact predictions and the mean absolute deviation 
(MAD) between observed and predicted disputes 
  l 1
ii MAD c c
m
=− ∑ , (9)  
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where  i c  denotes the number of observed and  l
i c  the number of predicted dis-
putes of Member i and m assigns the sample size. 
Both indicators prove that the thresholds regarding the incorporation of export 
flows is important as raising the threshold increases the fit of the model. This 
result supports the findigs of HORN ET AL. (1999) that the pattern of dispute ini-
tiation is to a large extent reflected by differences in Members’ diversity and 
value of trade. Table 6 comprises the results for the restricted model. The thresh-
old of $300K has no substantial influences on the results compared to no thresh-
old. Using the middle threshold of $500K, the MAD decreases by 30% to 1.67 
compared to 2.38 for the model without threshold. The fraction of exact predic-
tions increases from 23% to 43%. When the highest threshold is applied, the 
MAD decreases further by 38% to 1.04 while the fraction of exact predictions 
slightly increases to 49%. 
Table 6. Results for the restricted model subject to different thresholds for export 
flows 










Threshold     min  max  avg     
BETA 0  -7,7127           $0 
PROB 0,0004  127  115000  5530  2,38 23% 
BETA 0  -7,3363            $300K 
PROB 0,0007  94  79400  3796  2,32 25% 
BETA 0  -4,9581            $500K 
PROB 0,0070  16  6210  354  1,67 43% 
BETA 0  -3,2228            $700K 
PROB 0,0383 1  750  65  1,04 49% 
Source: Own compilation. 
For the unrestricted model the Akaike information criterion is utilized to select 
the relevant variables. Based on this, the incorporation of additional variables is 
traded off against the increased fit of the model. By incorporating additional ex-
planatory variables the goodness of fit is improved regardless of the number of 
free parameters in the data generating process. The indicator penalizes increasing 
complexity thus mitigating the danger of over-fitting. It is then sought after the 
model specification showing the lowest information criterion value. The proceed-
ing is stepwise: Starting from the restricted model, one additional variable is in-
cluded and corresponding information criterion calculated. In the next step the 
variable that yielded the lowest value is retained and the additions of the remain-
ing variables are assessed one by one. Additional variables are included as long as 
they reduce the information criterion. For the final model, standard errors of the  
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coefficients are derived using the bootstrap methods. The quality of the unre-
stricted model is further on validated by a likelihood ratio test. In this process the 
logarithmic likelihood function value of the unconstrained ML estimator  β , is 
compared with the likelihood function value of  the constrained ML estimator  β , 
which is obtained by maximizing the logarithmic likelihood function subject to 
the linear restrictions  j 00 k k β =∀≠ . The LR test statistic is computed as 
   ()  () 2 l n, , l n, iii ii LRL c n L c n ⎡⎤ =−
⎣⎦
β x β ., (10) 
which has a Chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number 
of imposed restrictions.
9 
According to this proceeding only four of the considered determinants are re-
tained in the final model: (1) Endured protectionism, (2) Own imposed protec-
tionism, (3) Influence of pressure groups and (4) WTO membership time result in 
a sufficient increase in the goodness of fit for no threshold and the thresholds 
$300K. For the application of the $500K threshold the variable Influence of pres-
sure groups and for the highest threshold of $700K both Influence of pressure 
groups and Own imposed protectionism are discarded in the selection process. 
Table 7 comprises the results for the selected specifications of the unrestricted 
model subject to different thresholds for export flows. The standard errors are 
given in brackets behind the respetive coefficients. All included variables show 
the hypothesized sign and except for the variable Influence of pressure groups, 
their influence is proven to be statistically significant. The variables’ joint signifi-
cant influence is verified by an asymptotic significance test based on the boot-
strapped sampling distribution of the estimator (see EFRON AND TIBSHIRANI, 
1993). Compared to the restricted model, the fraction of correct predictions are 
slighly higher for all thresholds. The mean absolute deviation between observed 
and predicted complaints decreases as well. This is mainly due to improved model 
behaviour for Members with a large number of observed disputes, predominantly 
for the EC and the U.S. Both measures show that the model amendment is much 
higher for the $300K threshold and the specification without threshold. 
                                                       
 
 
9 Estimation, selection of variables, the likelihood ratio test and the bootstrap re-sampling and test-
ing procedure are implemented in GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System), see BROOKE, A., 
KENDRICK, D., MEERAUS, A. AND R. RAMAN (1998): GAMS – A User’s Guide, GAMS Devel-
opment Corporation, Washington, DC. The standard errors of the coefficients are calculated for 
2000 re-sampling iterations.   
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Table 7. Results for unrestricted specification selections subject to different 
thresholds for export flows 
Explanatory variables
BETA 0 -9.373 -9.363 -9.583 -6.585
**2.113 (-1.27) **2.394 (1.30) ***2.934 (1.08) **1.730 (0.98)
***-2.030 (0.87) ***-2.465 (0.92) *-1.903 (1.20)
0.525 (0.67) 0.655 (0.69)
*1.424 (0.91) **1.707 (0.98) ***4.312 (1.64) *2.811 (2.12)
Mean of absolute 
deviations
Fraction of exact 
predictions
Level of significance for  














not included not included
1% 1% 1% 10%








* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level 
*** significant at the 1% level 
Source: Own compilation. 
The probability to complain per export flow covers a wide range: For the 
specification without threshold the highest probability is 4 times, for the highest 
threshold it is 26 times the lowest probability. However,  Member’s activity in 
dispute initiation cannot be inferred from its probability to complain without con-
sidering the number of its export flows: Being one of the two most active users of 
the system, the probability to complain for the EC falls into the lower third 
whereas the probability of Australia, Canada and the U.S. belong to the highest 
for all thresholds. For the $500K threshold the probability of the U.S. constitutes 
2.76 times the EC’s probability. Corresponding to their reciprocal ratio with re-
spect to their bilateral export flows (1: 2.25) this results in 32 predicted disputes 
for the U.S. (but 34 actually observed) and 26 for the EC (only 24 actually ob-
served). 
The likelihood ratio test proves a significant amendment of the model based on 
the incorporation of the addressed determinants. For the first three thresholds the 
concerned variables’ contribution could be substantiated at a 1% level, for the 
highest threshold at a 10% level of significance. 
The findings of HORN ET AL. (1999) on a significant influence of legal capac-
ity could not be supported in our analysis of food related disputes. This may be 
explained by the fact that legal capacity increasingly becomes an internationally 
tradable good such that each Member can purchase legal expertise, provided that  
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it has sufficient financial resources. The Advisory Centre on WTO Law 
(ACWL)
10 lists eleven law firms and four individuals on its ‘Roster of External 
Legal Counsel’. On the other hand, the findings of BOWN (2005) with respect to 
the influence of monetary means is not confirmed by our results either. Therefore, 
it seems more likely that legal capacity and monetary means are more relevant 
determinants for the overall number of dispute initiations but simply less impor-
tant for the variation of probabilities across countries for the smaller food sector. 
The indicators on Governmental efficiency and Relevance of the agricultural 
sector did also not survive the variable selection process The latter might simply 
be a insufficient proxy for the relevance of a Member’s agri-food-industry. Vari-
ables are not discarded due to multicollinearity, since the pairwise coefficient of 
correlation between selected and unselected variables is at most 0.34 for Legal 
capacity and WTO membership time. 
6  Conclusions 
This paper presented an analysis of the determinants for initiating WTO disputes 
related to the agri-food sector. Apart from this new sectoral focus, the analysis 
extended the literature with a more in-depth analysis of potentially relevant de-
terminants. The empirical model representing the number of initiated disputes by 
country as a sequence of Bernoulli trials – with probabilities modelled by a logis-
tic distribution – was applied to 53 WTO Member countries. 
The results show that some of the determinants relevant in previous dispute 
studies such as legal capacity and monetary means could not be confirmed as 
statistically relevant in the context of the agri-food sector. It could be shown that 
increasing own protectionist attitude lowers the probability to complain and the 
level of protection faced by a country leads to an increase as both variables prove 
to be statistically significant determinants of dispute initiation in the agri-food 
sector. At the same time, the duration of WTO membership clearly contributes to 
a larger likelihood to initiate a WTO dispute. Though selected for two of four 
possible model specifications with its expected sign, the Influence of private pres-
sure groups does not turn out to show a significant influence. Further research 
should focus on the improvement of data quality to validate or disprove the find-
ings on insignificant influences of some variables, for example the importance of 
the agri-food sector for the country considered. A generalisation of the model 
allowing to simultaneously incorporate characteristics of the defendant country 
                                                       
 
 
10 The ACWL is a WTO institution supporting developing countries with general legal advice on 
WTO matters and was established in 2001 at Geneva. Its “Roster of External Legal Counsel” is 
available at: http:// www.acwl.ch/e/tools/news_detailsphoto_e.aspx?id=3c188583-5884-4a1d-ae02-
e65b14370cc9, 15-04-2008.   
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would also be very useful. Currently, the implied assumption that probabilities to 
be a defendant is equal across all countries could only be partially mitigated by 
including the determinant Endured protectionism of the complaining country. 
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